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The Dead Sea has long been known the world over as a unique geographic
feature, having cultural, religious, and political significance.' Aristotle is said to
have been "the first to tell the world about the salty body of water where no fish
live and people float."2
Despite its name, the Dead Sea is neither "dead" nor a "sea." Though it is a
very large body of water, measuring some fifty-miles long and eleven-miles wide
at its widest point, the Dead Sea is, in fact, a lake. Like other inaccurately named
large bodies of water (such as the Caspian Sea, the Aral Sea, and the Sea of
Galilee), its name reflects its size and salinity, not its geographic or legal
character. Moreover, while the degree of its salinity-around ten times that of the
Mediterranean-renders the Dead Sea inhospitable to nearly all forms of life,
there are microscopic life forms that have adapted to the chemistry of its waters.
Additionally, large and diverse populations of birds and other animals live in and
around the lake.3
There are other well-known features of the lake that define its uniqueness.
For instance, the Dead Sea is the lowest point on the Earth's surface, some 400
meters, or 1340 feet, below sea level, and as will be discussed below, its level is
becoming progressively lower as its size decreases. Moreover, the Dead Sea is
located in one of the most arid regions on Earth, the Middle East. Additionally, it
is roughly bisected from the north to the south by the border between Jordan on
the eastern side, and Palestine (the West Bank) and Israel on the western side,
placing it in the middle of some of the most hotly-contested land on earth.
Finally, the Dead Sea, which has no outlets, is the terminus of the Jordan River
basin, a watershed shared by two upstream states, Lebanon and Syria.
Its geologic and human history would naturally lead one to assume that the
Dead Sea is a permanent feature of Middle-Eastern geography. But human
intervention has cast the Dead Sea's future into doubt. Its surface area has shrunk
by some thirty percent in the past fifty years, due to a twelve-meter (or about
* Distinguished Professor and Scholar, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. I would
like to thank Shea Murphy, Pacific McGeorge class of 2006, for his excellent assistance with this article.
1. See, e.g., Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel and Jordan Launch Global Campaign to Save the
Dead Sea, 10 Aug. 2002, available at http://www.mfa.gov.illmfa/mfaarchive2000-200912002/81 (follow
"Israel and Jordan Launch Global Campaign to Save the Dead Sea-August 2002" hyperlink) [hereinafter Israel
and Jordan] (stating that "[t]he biblical Sodom and Gomorrah, Mt. Nebo and Madaba grace the Dead Sea's
shores, which also served as the cradle of early Christianity[] and capital of ancient Moab").
2. TED Case Studies, No. 429, The Dead Sea Canal, http://gurukul.ucc.american.edu/ted/deadsea.htm
[hereinafter The Dead Sea Canal].
3. Israel and Jordan, supra note 1.
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forty feet) lowering of its water level. This article will briefly look at the causes
of the Dead Sea's rapid and continuing shrinkage, and current plans to restore it
to its former level.'
II. BACKGROUND
It might be thought that the cause of the Dead Sea's decrease in size is
related to its extremely ard environment. It is true that the lake loses some two
billion cubic meters of water per year due to evaporation! But this is obviously
not a new development; the Dead Sea has maintained its size in the face of this
evaporative loss for millennia. In fact, it is this tremendous volume of
evaporation over time combined with the Dead Sea's location at the terminus of
the Jordan River that has given rise to a unique concentration of minerals in the
lake, and in general its special character.
Historically, the flow of water into the Dead Sea was approximately equal to
the rate of evaporation. Two-thirds of this flow came from the Jordan River and
the rest from seasonal streams, or wadis, that feed the lake. However, the Dead
Sea's water balance began to change in the 1930s, as increased human settlement
in historic Palestine (roughly speaking, present-day Israel plus the West Bank
and Gaza Strip) placed greater demands on the waters of the Jordan River.
Today, Jordan and especially Israel both heavily rely on water from the stream.
The third riparian of the Lower Jordan River, Palestine's West Bank, has been
blocked by Israel from gaining access to the river since 1967,7 but would
certainly seek a share of its water in any permanent status agreement with Israel.
These heavy demands placed on the river by its riparians are linked to the
overall availability of water in the region. Water specialists, such as Mallin
Falkenmark and Peter Gleick, have set the threshold for "absolute water scarcity"
at 500 meters3 per person per year.8 The average availability of water per capita
in Palestine is presently about 70 meters3 per year. Jordan's supply is more than
double that at 160 meters3 per year. Even Israel, which utilizes about 330 meters3
per year on a per capita basis, is well below the absolute scarcity threshold. Thus,
4. A note on sources of information: I have been an adviser to the Palestinian National Authority since
the late 1990s, and in this capacity have had access to documents relating to the proposed Red Sea-Dead Sea
Water Conveyance ("RSDSC") as currently conceived. These documents, unfortunately, remain confidential. I
therefore cannot refer to them as would usually be done in a law review article. When factual information of a
non-confidential nature contained in the documents is presented in this article, reference will be made
generically to that source.
5. The Dead Sea Canal, supra note 2.
6. id.
7. AARON T. WOLF, HYDROPOLITICS ALONG THE JORDAN RIVER: SCARCE WATER AND ITS IMPACT ON
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 49-64 (United Nations University Press 1995).
8. See M. Falkenmark & C. Widstrand, Population and Water Resources: A Delicate Balance, 47
POPULATION BULL. No. 3, Population Reference Bureau, Washington D.C. (1992); Peter H. Gleick, Water and
Conflict: Fresh Water Resources and International Security, 18 INT'L SECURITY 79, 101-102 (Summer 1993).
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it is not surprising that the Jordan River, as the principal surface watercourse in
the area, is crucial to meeting the water needs of these three riparians.
Of the five co-riparians of the Jordan River Basin, Lebanon uses the least of
its water, diverting only about 10 million cubic meters per year ("mcm"). 9 Syria
and Jordan consume significantly greater quantities, most of which are drawn
from the Yarmouk River, a tributary of the Jordan that joins it below Lake
Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee). Jordan diverts some 320 mcm per year into its East
Ghor/King Abdullah Canal, which parallels the Lower Jordan River on its east
bank and is used for irrigation. Syria withdraws an average of 260 mcm per year
from the Jordan Basin through a number of small impoundments on the
Yarmouk; Israel prevented Jordan and Syria from constructing the planned
Maquarin storage dam on the river.'0
Israel consumes more Jordan River water than any of the other riparians,
diverting some 700 mcm per year from Lake Tiberias into its National Water
Carrier ("NWC"). This is as much water as the Jordan River delivers to Lake
Tiberias, which helps to explain why the Dead Sea is shrinking. Israel's NWC,
which began operation in the early 1960s, conveys this water out of the Jordan
River Basin for delivery to coastal cities and farms in the Negev desert. None of
this water returns to the Jordan River. Palestine, on the other hand, withdraws no
water from the Jordan River because Israel prevented the Palestinians from
gaining access to the river since it captured the West Bank in the 1967 Six Day
War.
Even if Palestinians had access to the portion of the Lower Jordan River to
which the West Bank is riparian, however, it would not significantly benefit
them. Diversions by Israel from Lake Tiberias into the NWC, and to a lesser
extent, those by Israel, Jordan, and Syria from the Yarmouk, reduce the flow of
the Jordan River below Lake Tiberias to a trickle. The water that does flow in the
Lower Jordan principally consists of that which is diverted there by Israel from
two sources, neither of which is usable without expensive treatment: saline
springs that would otherwise flow into Lake Tiberias, contaminating water
diverted by Israel into the NWC; and wastewater from the Israeli city of Tiberias.
These two sources, together with return flows from irrigation on both banks of
the Jordan that are laden with salt and agricultural chemicals, make up a large
part of the water that flows into the Dead Sea. Even this volume of water (which
may be also polluted) stands to decrease as the burgeoning populations of the
riparian states place increasing demands on shared freshwater resources.
9. Lebanon has ample supplies of freshwater from other sources, such as the Litani River.
10. However, Jordan and Syria are proceeding with plans to construct the Wehdeh Dam on the Yarmouk
River. See generally Oula Al Farawati, Water Ministry to Issue New Wehdeh Dam Tender, Jordan Times,
March 10, 2002, available at http://www.jordanembassyus.org/03102002006.htm.
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III. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION: THE "RED-DEAD CANAL"
Beginning as long ago as the nineteenth century, there have been a number of
proposals designed to generate electricity or desalinate seawater by taking
advantage of the 400-meter difference in elevation between sea level, whether
that of the Mediterranean or the Red Sea, and the Dead Sea. The plans would
convey seawater via tunnels, canals, or pipelines to the Dead Sea for use in
power generation, and more recently, desalination.
Israel, taking advantage of its position on the Mediterranean Sea, originally
proposed a conveyance from its coast to the Dead Sea (referred to in shorthand as
the "Med-Dead" canal). For its part, Jordan proposed bringing water from its
seacoast on the Gulf of Aqaba, the northeastern arm of the Red Sea (the "Red-
Dead" canal). Both plans were originally designed only to generate electricity.
Then in 1996, Harza Engineering of Chicago completed a study proposing the
use of a Red-Dead canal to produce electricity that would in turn power a
desalination plant to produce fresh water. This study provided the basis for the
project currently under consideration."
According to its supporters, a Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance"
("RSDSC") would have a number of benefits in its present form. As articulated
by Jordan and Israel, notably at the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable
Development held in August 2002 and at the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto
in March 2003, the "shared vision" of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance
Project, also referred to as the "Peace Conduit," is as follows: (a) "saving" the
Dead Sea; (b) making drinking water available at affordable prices to Jordan,
Israel, and the Palestinian National Authority; and (c) building a symbol of peace
and cooperation in the Middle East.'
3
The present version of the project is being chiefly promoted by Jordan, with
support from Israel and the World Bank.' 4 In view of the riparian status of the
West Bank as to both the Jordan River and Dead Sea, the Palestinian Authority
("PA") also has clear interests in the project and is a participant with Jordan and
Israel in the feasibility study process. Palestinians stand to benefit from the
project if freshwater is in fact delivered from it to the West Bank as described
below.
11. The Dead Sea Canal, supra note 2.
12. This is the name that was given the project currently under consideration in the Terms of Reference
for an Environmental, Technical and Economic Feasibility Study and Environmental and Social Assessment,
prepared by the World Bank in cooperation with Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority (Final Draft, 19
April 2005) (hereafter TORs) (on file with the author). While information contained in the TORs will appear
on the World Bank's website by the time this article is published, the TORs themselves are confidential at the
time of this writing. They are therefore cited only for information that is otherwise publicly available.
13. Id. at 13.
14. See, e.g., Israel and Jordan, supra note I (stating that Jordan and Israel "have joined forces to bring
international attention to the environmental jeopardy facing the Dead Sea Basin and to promote the 'Peace
Conduit' as a viable solution").
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The proposed project involves pumping water from the Red Sea at Aqaba,
Jordan, to an elevation of 220 meters. The water would then flow across the
Wadi Araba, in some places exposed and in others tunneling through the Jordan
Rift Valley mountains, in all covering some 200 kilometers before descending
over 600 meters into the Dead Sea, thereby introducing water from the Red Sea
into the Dead Sea. The seawater would be sent through a hydroelectric plant and
a hydro-static reverse osmosis treatment facility, producing electricity and fresh
water, and refilling the Dead Sea to the level of the 1930s over a period of ten to
twenty years. When the Dead Sea reaches its historic levels, the current scheme
reduces the flow of Red Sea water to match the rate of evaporation. Constructing
the conveyance would be no small undertaking. It would represent a major feat of
engineering, taking some ten years to complete at a cost in the neighborhood of
$5 billion. The conveyance would run generally along the border between Jordan
and Israel, entirely in Jordanian territory.
As already indicated, the stated purpose of a "Red-Dead Canal" has changed
over time. Originally conceived as a method of generating electricity, such a
project was later touted as a means of producing badly-needed freshwater. The
most recent justification given for the scheme has been that it will have the
environmental benefits associated with "saving" or restoring the historic level of
the Dead Sea. This was the first element of the "shared vision" of the project as
announced at the 2002 Johannesburg Summit. The production of drinking water
was relegated to second place in the "shared vision," with the project's value as a
symbol of peace and cooperation in the Middle East being listed third. The
production of electricity is no longer mentioned, though it would occur and is
indeed an essential part of the desalination process. It is unclear whether this
shifting in priorities and justifications is driven more by heightened environ-
mental awareness, political factors relating to the present inequitable allocation
of Jordan River water, or an attempt to make the project more attractive to
potential funders, particularly in environmentally-conscious Europe.
As currently conceived, the project's environmental benefits would result in
greater revenues from increased tourism. The Harza study estimated a $320
million benefit from tourism alone.'5 According to Harza, there would be
commercial benefits from the project as well, flowing from preservation of the
important salt and potash industries based on the unique mineral characteristics
of Dead Sea water.
But the production of drinking water clearly appears as the project's most
vital feature. The RSDSC would eventually produce some 850 mcm of
freshwater per year, two-thirds of which would go to Jordan (principally
Amman), and one-third to the Jerusalem area of Israel and Palestine." It has been
15. The Dead Sea Canal, supra note 2.
16. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Red Sea and the Mediterranean Dead Sea Canals Project,
10 Aug. 2002, available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfaarchive/2000_2009/2002/8/ (follow "The Red Sea
and the Mediterranean Dead Sea Canals Project" hyperlink) [hereinafter Canals Project].
2006 / The Shrinking Dead Sea and the Red-Dead Canal
estimated that Jordan's share would eliminate its water deficit, which has been
projected to be 430 mcm per year in 2020.1
IV. EVALUATION
Despite the optimistic predictions of the project's proponents, it potentially
suffers from several significant problems, some of which are factual while others
are legal. Beginning with possible issues of a factual character, the freshwater
that will be produced by the project will be quite expensive. Once the seawater is
desalinated, it will have to be pumped uphill to Amman and Jerusalem, each of
which is over 1100 meters above the level of the Dead Sea. When the expense of
pumping water to this altitude is coupled with that of the desalination process, it
is estimated that the water will cost the ultimate consumer $1.30 per cubic
meter. 8 This is more than twice the cost of desalinated water available near the
coast; raising the question of whether it would be cheaper to transport water from
coastal desalination facilities to areas of need, rather than to deliver it via a
project that will be very costly to construct.
Secondly (and ironically), the construction and operation of the RSDSC
could actually have adverse environmental effects in addition to the positive
ones. These possible impacts include: the mixing of Red Sea and Dead Sea
waters, resulting in the introduction of alien species of plants and other biota into
the Dead Sea and changes in the mineral composition of its water; adverse effects
on Red Sea coral reefs from the removal of the contemplated quantities of water
from the Red Sea; disruption of wildlife migration patterns in the Wadi Araba
along the route of the conveyance; and the potential for a leak along the course of
the canal, which could contaminate local fresh groundwater.
There are also significant legal issues to consider. First, customary
international law requires notification of all riparian states, regardless of their
position in the basin, of planned measures that may have a significant effect on
other riparians or, arguably, on the basin itself. '9 Given the possible impacts the
RSDSC could have, Jordan and Israel should notify the other riparians-namely
Lebanon and Syria-of the project details, and offer to consult with them on the
project." It is unknown if this has been done. Furthermore, the large withdrawals
of water from the Gulf of Aqaba implicate the interests of Egypt and Saudi
Arabia, which should also have been notified and consulted regarding the
project.2 The parties participating in the planning process-Jordan, Israel, the
17. WOLF, supra note 6, at 143.
18. The Dead Sea Canal, supra note 2.
19. See generally STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES 397-413
(2001).
20. Notification of Lebanon and Syria is also called for by the World Bank's rules. See World Bank
Operational Manual, Bank Procedures, Projects on International Waterways, BP 7.50 (October, 1994).
21. Id.
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PA, and the World Bank-share the duty to notify and consult potentially
affected states, and could all, in theory, be responsible for a violation of the
obligation.22
The project has also raised difficult issues on a political level. In particular,
the terms of reference for the feasibility study regarding the project have
engendered controversy over such questions as whether the PA is a "riparian" to
the Dead Sea and the Jordan River-something that most observers had taken for
granted. More generally, the Palestinians are concerned that, as with other
proposed projects involving the provision of desalinated water to Palestine, Israel
(with the support of the United States) may attempt to use the RSDSC to avoid
having to reallocate the freshwater resources-including both surface water and
groundwater-that it shares with the Palestinians.
V. CONCLUSION
At first blush, the Red Sea-Dead Sea Water Conveyance Project strikes many
observers as being an example of the hubris of engineers: overly complex, highly
expensive, and even far-fetched. However, the fact that it is being seriously
considered demonstrates how precious additional supplies of freshwater are in
this arid and water-stressed region, and the lengths to which people will go to
produce it. Despite the issues it raises, it appears to be within the realm of
possibility that the project will ultimately go forward, given the strong support it
enjoys on the part of Israel, the World Bank, and especially Jordan.
Only time will tell whether the project is economically viable, and to what
extent it will have significant adverse environmental effects. It is also unknown
whether Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt will assert their interests,
possibly delaying the project or even bringing about its demise. What does seem
clear is that the Jordan River riparians will, in the future, need to continue to
strive to perform the difficult task of providing sufficient freshwater to their
growing populations. However, unless a region-wide cooperative solution can be
reached, they remain, like Sisyphus, condemned to repeatedly fall short.
22. The World Bank, as an international organization, possesses international legal personality and could
theoretically be held responsible in an appropriate way for such a breach. The status of the PA as an
international legal person is less clear.

